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Convergence or Divergence? Visions of World Order and the Russian-Chinese Relationship 
The version accepted for publication by European Politics and Society 
Author: Marcin Kaczmarski 
Abstract: Scholars studying Sino-Russian relations remain divided regarding the extent to 
which Russia and China’s visions of the international order converge or diverge. This article 
addresses this question by comparing how Russian and Chinese elites interpret the evolution 
of world order and how they imagine the end goals of this evolution. My analysis shows that 
Russian and Chinese views on world order partly overlap and partly diverge. Russia and China’s 
defiance of Western primacy in international politics provides a basis for cooperation. Both 
countries distrust the West and oppose a number of policies pursued by the United States and 
its European allies. At the same time, leaders in Moscow and Beijing do not fully agree on 
what alternative norms they would like to promote. While joint declarations paper over this 
divergence, the differences are more pronounced in the patterns of Russian and Chinese 
practical engagement with global governance and their attitudes towards globalization and 
anti-globalization movements. The Chinese leadership appears to be genuinely interested in 
contributing to political and economic stability, while Moscow seeks first and foremost the 
symbolic confirmation of its great-power status and does not mind the role of an occasional 
spoiler. The article concludes that these differences have the potential to slow down, if not 
derail, long-term cooperation between Russia and China. 
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INTRODUCTION  
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The rise of powers such as China, India and Brazil as well as the resurgence of Russia have 
been the most visible signs of the ongoing global power shift. These states demonstrate 
capacity to contribute to the production of international and regional order and share an 
aspiration for a greater say in world affairs. The implications of their rise for the liberal 
international order have been at the centre of scholarly debate since the mid-2000s (for 
contrasting views, see Ikenberry, 2008; Kagan, 2008; Kupchan, 2012). 
Russia and China stand out among the emerging powers due to a number of reasons, including 
permanent seats in the UN Security Council and substantial military and economic resources. 
Both states were identified as rivals by the United States in its 2017 National Security Strategy 
(White House, 2017, pp. 25-28). Indeed, many Western governments remain deeply disturbed 
by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in eastern Ukraine as well as by China’s 
aggressive pursuit of territorial claims in the South China Sea and its rejection of the ruling by 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The questions of how Russia and China see 
the future of world order and whether they are willing and capable of changing it is thus one 
of the most pressing issues in the debate on rising powers. 
If anything, the debate on Russian-Chinese relations and their long-term implications for the 
international order has accelerated in the aftermath of the 2014 Russian-Western conflict 
over Ukraine. The growing interest of scholars and analysts has resulted in an impressive 
number of books (Bolt and Cross, 2018; Kaczmarski, 2015; Lee and Lukin, 2016; Lo, 2017; 
Lubina, 2017; Lukin, 2018; Luzyanin, 2018), articles (Flikke, 2016; Korolev, 2016; Krickovic, 
2017; Wilson, 2018; Wishnick, 2017) and reports (Bond, 2016; Chase et al., 2017; Duchâtel 
and Godement, 2016; Stronski and Ng, 2018) that explore particular aspects of the ties 
between Moscow and Beijing. 
While most observers agree that Russia and China reject US primacy in global affairs, there is 
a significant dispute in the literature on the extent to which both states are dissatisfied with 
the existing liberal international order and whether their visions of a future order converge 
(Korolev, 2016; Lubina, 2017; Wilson, 2018) or diverge (Lo, 2017; Snetkov and Lanteigne, 
2014). Some authors emphasise that Russia and China embrace multipolarity and envision a 
global concert of great powers (Lubina, 2017, p. 284) or point to “a consensual view on the 
international political system” (Wilson, 2018, p. 3). Others remain sceptical. Bobo Lo, for 
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example, argues that Moscow and Beijing differ in their attitudes towards the post-Cold War 
order, as their understandings of multipolarity vary (Lo, 2017, p. xx). According to Lo, both 
states have “contrasting visions of their respective places in the twenty first century global 
order” (Lo, 2017, p. xv-xvi). While Russia is on the “losing” end, China has vested interests in 
the preservation of at least some part of the present order. Likewise, Paul Bolt and Sharyl 
Cross speak of “common views on most major world issues” (Bolt and Cross, 2018, p. 1), but 
notice that Russia’s and China’s dissatisfaction with the liberal order is selective and 
differentiated (Bolt and Cross, 2018, p. 154-155).  
In this article, I aim to contribute to this debate by comparing how Russian and Chinese elites 
interpret the evolution of world order. Juxtaposing these visions with Russian and Chinese 
practices in the realm of global governance, I will address the issue of convergence – i.e., to 
what extent these Russian and Chinese visions and practices are conducive to Sino-Russian 
cooperation in a long-term perspective. 
At first sight, it seems as if Moscow and Beijing agree on the kind of international order they 
would like to establish. The ruling elites in both states repeatedly emphasise their countries’ 
unique global roles, especially with regard to international security and conflict resolution. 
They cherish the traditional, “Westphalian” definition of sovereignty, which they understand 
as the state’s impunity within its borders. At the same time, they broaden the notion of state 
sovereignty to encompass new global commons such as cyberspace (Nocetti, 2015). 
Moreover, the political elites in both countries are united in their rejection of several aspects 
of the contemporary liberal order, above all the Western promotion of democracy and its 
interventionist human rights agenda. Moscow and Beijing express their desire for a diminished 
role of Western states in general and the US in particular, which is reflected in their calls for a 
“democratization” of international relations. Membership in key global institutions, especially 
their permanent seats in the UN Security Council, enables both states to influence the global 
agenda according to their shared normative orientations. Apart from cooperation in existing 
institutions, Russia and China have also been working to create a parallel set of institutions at 
the global level, first and foremost by establishing the BRICS forum and supplementing it with 
a number of additional institutional arrangements, such as the New Development Bank. 
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The similarity of these visions stands in contradiction to the ways in which China and Russia 
present themselves to the external world, their respective places in global governance and 
their practices related to the construction of international order. In other words, both states 
differ increasingly not only in terms of power capabilities, but also in their interactions with 
the outside world. China supports economic globalization, even though it continues to protect 
large chunks of its economy. In many ways, it prefers the maintenance of the status quo for 
the sake of predictability and stability. Russia, on the other hand, seems to turn more towards 
protectionism and finds regionalization a better way for maintaining its position in the 
international pecking order. In recent years, moreover, Moscow appears to thrive on 
instability and chaos in international politics. For example, it seeks to propel and derive 
advantages from rising populism in the West. I argue that China and Russia’s conflicting 
preferences create serious obstacles for the long-term stability of their cooperation.1 
The article proceeds as follows. First, I reconstruct China’s and Russia’s overlapping visions of 
the international order. Second, I focus on the differences in both states attitudes towards 
and practices in global governance. In the third and concluding section, I explain the reasons 
for these differences and discuss the implications for long-term Sino-Russian cooperation. 
THE JOINT VISION 
The overlapping Russo-Chinese vision of international order is most clearly expressed in 
numerous joint declarations and documents adopted during annual summits.2 These 
documents provide insights into the scope of their shared interests and concerns as well as an 
understanding of the Russia-China relationship with regard to the dimension of global order. 
In addition, Moscow and Beijing have issued several joint statements dedicated specifically to 
international affairs that describe in more detail their shared positions on key global issues. In 
the last ten years, three such documents have been adopted: in 2008, 2011 and 2017. These 
documents are supplemented by joint issue-focused declarations, such as one on 
international law (2016) and strategic stability (2016). 
                                                 
1 The complexity and internal contradictions of Russia and China’s visions of world order makes it difficult to 
classify them in terms of status quo or (neo-)revisionist powers. For depictions of Russia as a ‘neo-revisionist’ 
power, see (Sakwa, 2017). For a view of China as a revisionist actor, see (Callahan, 2016). 
2 For a quantitative analysis of Russian-Chinese treaties and agreements, see (Ambrosio, 2017). 
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In these communications, several points of convergence between Russia and China can be 
identified: common views on the evolution of international order; emphasis on the centrality 
of the UN; common attitudes towards global and regional security challenges; and joint 
approaches towards multilateral cooperation in international affairs. Let us take a closer look 
at each of these points.   
Evolving Attitudes to International Order 
The shared idea of being entitled to a privileged position in international politics finds its 
reflection in Sino-Russian declarations that are adopted at annual summits. They usually 
provide a catalogue of the positions agreed to by the two states regarding ongoing conflicts, 
“hot-spots” and challenges to global and regional security. Moscow and Beijing emphasise 
that their cooperation contributes to international peace and stability and reaffirm recurrently 
their readiness to jointly tackle challenges to regional and global security (Rossiyskaya 
Federatsiya, 2018). The documents also maintain that Sino-Russian cooperation serves to 
sustain ‘strategic balance and stability in the world’ (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and 
contributes to strengthen peace, security and stability in regional and global dimensions 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). It is important to note here that international security is 
interpreted by Moscow and Beijing in a state-centric manner. Both states prioritize the 
maintenance of the status quo insofar as they tend to support incumbents in domestic 
conflicts and civil wars. Regular references condemning “external interference” are usually 
directed at the West and its engagement or intervention in particular conflicts. Additionally, 
Moscow and Beijing state that their goal is to democratize international relations and to create 
a more just and ‘rational polycentric international order’ (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b, 
2018). 
In the beginning of the 2010s, Russia and China argued that the international system was 
undergoing a transition to “a polycentric basis”, while the global economic crisis had proven 
the ineffectiveness of the current global governance system (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, 
p. point 1). Over the course of the last decade, both states have come to see the pace of these 
changes accelerating against the backdrop of deepening interdependence between states and 
the pressing need for a reform of global governance mechanisms (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 
2012, 2014b). In other words, Moscow and Beijing agree that world politics is moving towards 
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multipolarity (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012) and that global competition and rivalry has 
become more intense (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). In fact, the belief in an irreversible 
drive of the world towards multipolarity can be traced back to the previous decade 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008). The same goes for other features of contemporary global 
politics, such as the persistent tendency of Western states for undertaking unilateral actions 
and the deepening of economic globalization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008). In recent years, 
both states have also recognized growing instability and unpredictability in the world, 
including high conflict potential, increasing geopolitical contradictions and protectionism 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), along with weak economic growth and reversals of 
globalization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017).  
In several of their latest declarations, Moscow and Beijing have supported the pursuit of a 
“new type of international relations”, which is a clear reference to Chinese diplomatic 
vocabulary (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018), although the phrase of “new international 
relations” had also been used previously by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the 
early 1980s. These “new international relations” should be based on win-win cooperation and 
the creation of a shared destiny community (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), which once again 
borrows from the rhetoric of Chinese diplomacy. Already in 2008, for example, both states 
spoke of the creation of a harmonious international order – a concept that was strongly 
promoted at the time by the Chinese leadership. At the same time, when both states speak of 
equal participation of all states in global governance, the primacy of international law 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and especially the need to provide for equal and indivisible 
security (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), one can see clear references to Russian diplomatic 
rhetoric. The presence of this type of wording in joint declarations suggests mutual 
recognition of each other’s strategic narratives towards global politics and international order. 
The Centrality of the UN and the Primacy of International Law 
Moscow and Beijing declare the United Nations to be the most important global institution.3 
Both states place the UN and their key institution – the UN Security Council (UNSC) – at the 
centre of their world order visions.  
                                                 
3 (on China’s position, see also Godement et al., 2018). 
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The centrality of the UN is reflected in Russia and China’s support of multilateralism as well as 
in both countries’ affirmation of the UN’s pivotal role in global governance (Rossiyskaya 
Federatsiya, 2018) and securing global peace (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Moscow and 
Beijing deem the UN to be the most universal, representative and authoritative forum 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 2; 2012). Additionally, both Russia and China 
emphasize that the Security Council should retain its role as the major institution responsible 
for international peace and security. Thus, both countries strongly oppose attempts by other 
states to circumvent the UNSC when conducting military operations (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 
2012, 2018).  
With regard to a reform of the United Nations and the primary role of the UNSC, Russia and 
China stay on the side of maintaining the status quo. To be sure, they are ready – at least on 
the rhetorical level – to support a UNSC reform that would increase the participation of 
smaller and medium-sized states (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017), but prefer a “package 
reform” and oppose any “artificial” deadlines (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). In 
practice, such an approach equates postponing the reform for an indefinite period. One 
reason for this is that their permanent seats give them a veto over any “constitutional” policy 
shifts, which in turn allows them to protect themselves and their allies from interference 
promoted by Western great powers. The US or Western unilateralism is deemed unacceptable 
by Moscow and Beijing not least because it threatens to render their veto in the UNSC useless. 
Thus, it is both fundamental and instrumental for Moscow and Beijing to strengthen the UNSC. 
As is well known to observers of international relations, both China and Russia attempt to 
shape the agenda and practices in UN forums in such a way as to prevent the organization 
from interfering in the domestic affairs of particular states. Thus, from Beijing and Moscow’s 
perspective, any shifts in how international order works should not undermine the central role 
played by the UNSC. 
The declared respect for international law as a way to regulate inter-state relations follows 
from the preceding. Russia and China have recurrently emphasized their attachment to 
international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3; 2018) and the need to reaffirm 
the primacy of international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). Moreover, in 2016, the 
Russian and Chinese foreign ministries adopted the Declaration on the Promotion of 
International Law (Russian Federation, 2016). In the declaration, the two states emphasised 
 8 
the principles of sovereign equality (point 2) and non-intervention in “internal or external 
affairs” (point 4), rejected “unilateral sanctions” (point 6) and called for respecting obligations 
related to state immunity (point 8). 
In short, Sino-Russian support for international law is tightly interlinked with calls for 
respecting state sovereignty. State sovereignty, non-interference and territorial integrity are 
regularly invoked by government officials in Beijing and Moscow as key elements of 
international order (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2014b, 2017). In 2011, it was related to 
the outbreak of the Arab revolutions, with Russia and China calling for non-interference of 
external forces into domestic processes in the region (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 
19). They also criticized the broadened interpretations of the UNSC resolutions 1970 and 1973 
related to Libya (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 20). In more recent years, both states 
have explicitly protested against regime change by means of illegal interference from the 
outside and against the extraterritorial application of national laws in contradiction with 
international law (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3). 
Finally, when declaring their support for such issues as human rights, both Beijing and Moscow 
emphasise that each state has their own right to choose the way of development (2017, point 
7). Their declaration adds that states should respect historical heritage, cultural traditions and 
the right of each nation to define their future (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 3). They 
also protest against the “politicization” of human rights (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. 
point 7) and the imposition of parochial standards under the guise of their allegedly universal 
nature (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Instead, Russia and China maintain that one should 
respect each state’s specific situation in the sphere of human rights (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 
2008). This attitude is usually accompanied by support for inter-cultural and inter-civilizational 
dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2012, 2014b). 
Global and Regional Security 
In terms of global and regional security, Russia and China rhetorically reaffirm their readiness 
to participate in the construction of an international security architecture that would be based 
on the non-use of force, non-interference in domestic affairs and political-diplomatic conflict 
resolution (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018). International security should remain common and 
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indivisible (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2012), without any dividing lines in the Euro-
Atlantic and Eurasian areas (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 12).  
Striving to maintain “global and regional strategic balance and stability”, both states oppose 
the development and deployment of missile defence systems (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 
2018). Indeed, the issue of missile defence has been raised regularly and is connected with 
the non-militarization of space (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, p. point 9; 2011). With regard 
to the outer space, both states continue to promote their joint draft treaty they put forward 
in 2014, which forbids deploying arms and weapons in space, and regularly warn of the threat 
of space militarization (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). At the same time, Russia and 
China support the non-proliferation regime (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017), although they 
have stopped short of declaring their support for the idea of a nuclear-free world, which could 
be found in earlier declarations (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 8).  
Their state-centred view of international security notwithstanding, Russia and China pay 
increasing attention to non-traditional and non-military threats in policy documents. Both 
states emphasise the need to fight terrorism, which they usually link to extremism. At the 
same time, they condemn “politicization” or “double standards” with regard to this issue 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008; 2017, p. point 4; 2018). This can be interpreted as a veiled 
criticism of Western states’ policies on countering terrorism. The language has evolved over 
time towards a harsher critique, as for instance the 2011 declaration did not mention “double 
standards” and merely called for international cooperation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. 
point 7). Russia and China also emphasize that the UN should have a coordinating role in the 
fight against international terrorism (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, 2014b).  
Likewise, both states have vowed to prevent the use of information and communication 
technologies for terrorist purposes (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 4) and appeal to 
respect each state’s right to choose their own model of managing cybersecurity (Rossiyskaya 
Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 6). In fact, the topic of information security has appeared 
consistently in joint declarations throughout the last decade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, 
p. point 10; 2014b, 2017). Relatedly, China and Russia have openly stated their uneasiness 
about the potential use of information technologies to undermine international stability and 
infringe upon state sovereignty (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). 
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Moscow and Beijing have also warned of the surge in non-traditional security threats, such as 
the uncontrolled flow of migrants, highly dangerous pandemics and climate change 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017). In that context, it is interesting note that when referring to 
climate change, both have emphasized their readiness to cooperate closely with others 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). At the same time, China and Russia have invoked the 
principle of a “common but differentiated responsibility” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2008, p. 
point 11; 2011).  
Regional conflicts and “hot spots” also continue to attract the attention of both states. They 
have declared to “respect each other’s interests in third states, regions and international 
groupings” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and have coordinated their positions with regard 
to several regional issues. A case in point is the Syrian civil war. Moscow and Beijing have 
repeatedly called for respecting Syria’s territorial integrity (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012; 
2017, p. point 19; 2018). They have also criticized Western states’ attempts to push for regime 
change (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012) and supported the process of chemical weapons 
liquidation (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Likewise, the conflict in Afghanistan appears 
regularly in joint communications. Russia and China have called for a rebuilding of the country 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and declared their support for the ongoing peace process 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 20). They have also proposed to make Afghanistan an 
“independent state” (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012, 2014b). Indeed, in 2011, they suggested 
that Afghanistan should become a neutral country (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 
21). The latter phrase, however, did not reappear in later communications.  
Concerning the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, both states have emphasized the need to 
find a comprehensive solution (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) and to pursue a 
denuclearization of the peninsula by means of political dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 
2011, p. point 17; 2017, p. point 17). They see a downscaling in military activities in the region 
and a return to the Six-Party Talks as the best way forward (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. 
point 17). Another nuclear proliferation-related issue, the crisis surrounding Iran’s nuclear 
programme, has also attracted a lot of Russian and Chinese attention. Both states have 
promised to protect the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018) 
and cited it as an example of the benefits that result from “open international cooperation” 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 21). In their communications in previous years, 
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Moscow and Beijing pleaded for the resolution of the Iranian crisis by way of political-
diplomatic means and protested vehemently against the application of extensive pressure on 
Iran, including unilateral sanctions (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). In this context, it is also 
interesting to note that the Arab-Israeli conflict is mentioned only sporadically in joint Russo-
Chinese documents (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). 
Regional conflicts in the respective neighbourhood of Russia and China are an especially 
sensitive topic. In 2011, China recognized Russia’s efforts to protect its vital interests and 
contribute to regional peace and stability in the South Caucasus and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 16). In 2014, both states 
expressed their serious worries about “domestic conflict in Ukraine” and called for de-
escalation and a nationwide dialogue (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). Whereas China was 
willing to acknowledge that Russia has special interests in the post-Soviet space, it stopped 
short of supporting its offensive foreign policy moves in this region. Beijing did not recognize 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s independence and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Moscow has 
mirrored this policy with regard to China’s policy towards the South China Sea. This is to say 
that Russia has retained a neutral stance but nuances its position by declaring that outside 
powers should not interfere in the South China Sea disputes. As these examples illustrate, 
Russia and China walk a fine line with regard to each other’s regional disputes. On the one 
hand, they are ready to tolerate the other’s aggressive behaviour in its respective “near 
abroad”. On the other hand, neither of the two is willing to openly support such actions. 
Multilateralism in International Order 
Russia and China present themselves as staunch proponents of multilateral cooperation. In 
each communication, they enumerate particular formats of cooperation and declare their 
support for them. The catalogue encompasses the BRICS format, the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), the G-20 Group, the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Russia-China-India triangle, the Asia-Europe Forum (ASEM) 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) formats of external cooperation 
(Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b, 2017). 
Both countries also support rhetorically an open, just and non-discriminatory system of global 
trade (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2012). In terms of economic multilateralism, Russia and China 
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regard the WTO as the core of the global trade system (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018), with 
regional arrangements playing a subsidiary role (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, p. point 8). At 
the same time, they emphasize the need for reform of the international financial architecture 
and a broader role for developing states (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014b). In particular, 
Moscow and Beijing welcome a growing role of the G-20 in the areas of global finance and 
economics (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 3) and hail collaboration pursued within 
the BRICS grouping (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2011, p. point 4). Russia and China actively push 
for the transformation of BRICS into a mechanism of cooperation and coordination with 
regard to global financial-economic and international-political problems (Rossiyskaya 
Federatsiya, 2014b). Moreover, Moscow and Beijing jointly oppose theimposition of unilateral 
economic sanctions as well as unfair trade practices (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2018). This falls 
in line with their opposition towards the unilateral use of force and reveals a general dislike 
of unilateral actions over which they have no veto power. Both have also declared their 
support for sustainable growth, stability of the international financial system, and the 
liberalization of trade and investment (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017; 2018, p. point 8). 
Moreover, in the realm of development cooperation, Russia and China have repeatedly 
declared their support for the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals and the 
UN Development Agenda by 2030 as well as called for strengthening global development 
partnerships (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2017, 2018). 
In sum, it becomes clear that there is substantial overlap between Russia and China’s world 
order visions. As illustrated by this analysis, the content of joint statements has evolved over 
time but with regard to details rather than fundamental issues. The ensuing changes can be 
ascribed either to shifts and corrections in Russian or Chinese foreign policies, or to the 
emergence of new global and regional issues, which required Moscow and Beijing to react. In 
general, there is no doubt that the declarations reflect a “common denominator” between 
the two states regarding international affairs. Thus, judging by the number of areas in which 
Moscow and Beijing have similar views, one might expect them to cooperate closely in the 
realm of global governance. This is not the case, however, as the next section will show. 
RUSSIA AND CHINA’S DIVERGING ATTITUDES TO AND PRACTICES IN WORLD ORDER 
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Notwithstanding the apparent convergence between Russia and China’s world order visions, 
both states portray their roles in the international arena in quite different ways. Two 
paradigmatic statements by both states’ leaders symbolize this discrepancy: Vladimir Putin’s 
speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 (Putin, 2007) and Xi Jinping’s 
speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2017 (Xi, 2017). 
The Russian government’s message to the world remains grounded in Putin’s Munich speech. 
Moscow sees itself first and foremost as a great power and a bulwark against US dominance 
and unipolarity. Russia seeks affinity with all actors dissatisfied with US policies. This message 
has been repeated regularly, the most recent example being Putin’s 2018 address to the 
Federal Assembly, where he emphasized Russia’s military prowess and reaffirmed his 
readiness to resist the US. This approach overshadows other attempts by Russian 
policymakers to present their country as an important economic actor in world politics. 
China, in turn, focuses more on the economic sphere and depicts itself the locomotor of 
globalization. This self-branding is best represented in Xi Jinping’s Davos speech. Using Donald 
Trump’s protectionist rhetoric as a counterpoint, Xi portrayed China as a defender of 
globalization and presented China’s economic rise as an opportunity for the world, developing 
and developed states alike. While Beijing admits that China itself is still a developing country 
in the process of modernization, the fact remains that China has enormous material 
capabilities and resources. This in turn enables it to support other countries economically 
when Western states fail to do so. Of course, this does not mean that China shies away from 
demonstrating its military power, as proven by the growing global presence of the PLA Navy, 
including its participation in joint naval drills with Russia in the Mediterranean and the Baltic 
Seas. However, Beijing’s goal clearly is to impress international audiences with China’s 
economic success rather than with its military might. For example, when Xi Jinping referred to 
international security issues at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building 
Measures in Asia (Xi, 2014), he wrapped Chinese political ambitions and security goals in the 
language of win-win cooperation and emphasised the inclusive nature of Chinese proposals in 
the realm of security. 
That said, it must be noted that the tone of debates in Chinese-language publications, 
addressed towards the domestic audience, is much more critical towards the West. There is 
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no such discrepancy in the Russian discourse. The self-representations of China and Russia 
directed towards the external audience are not, however, mere PR-exercises. Rather, they 
reveal deep differences between Moscow and Beijing in their attitudes towards the existing 
global order as well as divergences in their long-term aims. The attitude of China’s ruling elite 
towards contemporary international order is nuanced. While Beijing remains dissatisfied with 
some elements of the existing order, in particular US primacy, it recognizes the benefits that 
the post-Cold War period has brought to China (Breslin, 2016). As a result, China prefers an 
incremental shift in international status hierarchies and international arrangements that will 
empower Beijing. Any change in the global order should neither undermine general political-
economic stability nor harm economic openness. The Russian elite, on the other hand, does 
not consider the current arrangements of international order as beneficial to Russia’s great-
power interests. Moscow appears determined to regain its privileged position in a rather short 
period, including with the use of its renewed military capabilities. Moreover, Moscow is ready 
to fuel populism and an anti-globalist agenda and seeks to exploit international turmoil to 
enhance its own position. 
Globalisation and Global Populism 
Reluctance and resistance towards the West’s domination in global politics has underpinned 
Russian-Chinese relations for the past two decades. Yet Russia and China’s responses to anti-
globalist movements and global populism differ significantly, as do their long-term 
expectations related to the future of globalization. 
Russia appears to relish the West’s internal difficulties, embracing and fuelling the populist 
and anti-globalization turn. President Putin has depicted globalization as a project in crisis, led 
by a selfish elite that has left the majority of people around the world impoverished and 
frustrated. Indeed, the Russian elite did not hide its satisfaction of Trump’s victory in the US 
presidential elections. Russia also cheered the Brexit result and the United Kingdom’s decision 
to leave the European Union, seeing it as a step to the further unravelling of Europe’s post-
war political and economic project (Bordachev, 2018). Over the past years, Russia has also 
established a network of contacts with Europe’s far-right and, to a lesser extent, far-left 
political parties (Keating and Kaczmarska, 2017; Shekhovtsov, 2017). 
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China, on the other hand, has turned into a staunch supporter of globalization, viewing the 
turmoil in the West’s political landscape with a mix of Schadenfreude and genuine concern. 
Chinese leaders argue that globalization cannot be blamed for all the world’s problems and 
warn that a reversal of globalization is neither desirable nor possible (Xi, 2017, 2018). 
Consequently, China has opted for a mix of stability and incremental change. Beijing, for 
example, was in favour of the UK remaining in the EU. Having repeatedly declared its support 
for European unity, China has also denounced the rise of populist forces throughout Europe. 
Regarding the US presidential election, voices in China remain divided. Chinese state media 
has presented Trump’s controversial campaign and his subsequent victory as the ultimate 
proof of democracy’s inherent weaknesses. Although Hillary Clinton was not particularly 
popular in Beijing – due to her contribution to the US’s pivot to Asia under President Obama 
– her election victory would have brought much more predictability to Sino-American 
relations, which is exactly what Beijing wants.  
In many ways, China needs international stability more than Russia does. China’s economic 
growth – which is the ultimate means of legitimizing the power of the Chinese Communist 
Party at home – relies on open trade, stable markets and wealthy Western consumers. China 
needs a co-operative international system in order to sell its goods, to export the overcapacity 
of its industry, and to invest its currency reserves. Russia, on the other hand, counts on 
“controlled chaos” and instability beyond its borders as a way of upgrading its relative position 
in the international realm. 
The different attitudes towards globalization are also reflected in Russia and China’s regional 
initiatives. For Beijing, the creation of the Silk Road Economic Belt is a way to increase China’s 
ties with the world and deepen mutual interdependence. China aspires to reinforce openness 
generated by globalization and to prevent other powers from building closed regional blocs. 
China’s goal behind the New Silk Road is to foster greater extra-regional integration and offer 
a new version of globalization. For Russia, on the other hand, the Eurasian Economic Union is 
a way to fence off the post-Soviet space from global influences and to introduce protectionist 
measures (Kaczmarski, 2017).  
More specifically, the Russian elite attempts to achieve two contradictory goals with the help 
of the EEU. On the one hand, Moscow aspires to maintain political primacy in the post-Soviet 
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space, thus preventing other actors from gaining a foothold in the region without Russia’s 
consent. On the other hand, the political establishment wants the Russia-led economic 
cooperation project to go beyond the post-Soviet space. After all, the post-Soviet space is not 
particularly promising for Russia in terms of possible economic benefits, especially when 
juxtaposed with either the EU or East Asia. This tension reflects a deeper contradiction in the 
Russian elite’s thinking about international politics. Moscow-sponsored regionalism aims to 
protect the post-Soviet space and Russia from the negative consequences of globalisation and 
international turbulences, while simultaneously it is supposed to open new possibilities for 
Russia to increase its impact on global politics. In other words, Moscow aspires to make the 
EEU into one of the centres of the multipolar world order and a link between East Asia and 
Western Europe, while maintaining its regional focus. These two objectives are difficult to 
reconcile. 
China’s New Silk Road project is part of Beijing’s ambition to rearrange its neighbourhood and 
to create a new structure of regional cooperation. However, the most outstanding feature of 
the Chinese project is its flexibility and the absence of strict geographical boundaries, which 
results in openness and low, if any, ‘entry barriers’. Beijing’s more recent additions, the so-
called Polar Silk Road that includes the Arctic and the Northern Sea Route as well as presenting 
cooperation with Latin American states as part of the project, confirm how flexible the idea is 
and testify to Beijing’s global ambitions. Defining its vision of cooperation in functional rather 
than spatial terms. China seeks to transcend existing regional arrangements and prevent other 
powers from the creation of closed political-economic blocs. The New Silk Road is thus 
evolving from a regional project towards a new version of globalization (Kaczmarski, 2017). 
Russia’s and China’s Diverging Practices 
In the realm of global economic governance, China pursues a dual-track policy of reinforcing 
its position in existing structures and establishing its own parallel institutions. China has 
worked hard to increase its share both in the World Bank and in the IMF (from 3.67% in the 
mid-2000s to 6.09% in 2018). Indeed, the IMF now includes the yuan as reserve currency. In 
parallel, China has established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015, despite 
the open opposition of the US, and convinced a number of American allies from Europe and 
Asia to join the AIIB. What is more, in the framework of the BRICS grouping, China has 
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supported the establishment of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve 
Arrangement, which duplicate the functions of the IMF and the World Bank. The fact that 
Shanghai was made the seat of the New Development Bank can be seen as a symbolic 
confirmation of China’s leadership within the BRICS group. In contrast, Russia’s role in global 
economic governance remains marginal. Whereas China has sufficient economic resources to 
upgrade its position within the international financial architecture, Russia has to struggle to 
retain its position in global financial and economic institutions. Despite joining WTO in 2012, 
Russia has not opened up to trade and was among the states erecting the biggest number of 
trade restrictions (Solanko, 2016, p. 6-7). Contrary to China, Russia has not managed to join 
the core group of WTO negotiators – that is, states which effectively exercises veto power in 
the negotiation process (Jordan, 2017, p. 465). Moreover, even though Russia and China 
jointly established the BRICS-led New Development Bank, it is the AIIB set up by China that is 
widely regarded as the more serious contribution to global governance in the economic 
sphere. This is illustrated by the fact that more than 50 states – including Russia – joined the 
bank as founding members. Meanwhile, Russia’s Eurasian Development Bank, established 
more than a decade ago, remains limited to EEU members. 
Russia and China’s approaches to global security governance vary as well. Russia continues to 
stand out as the West’s major challenger in the global strategic realm. Moreover, Moscow 
seeks to compensate for its economic weakness with intensified political-diplomatic activity, 
particularly with regard to international crises. For example, as is well known, Russia plays a 
key role in the Syrian civil war. Not only prevented Moscow a US military intervention in Syria 
in 2013, but it was able to intervene militarily itself in support of the Assad regime. China, on 
the other hand, maintains a relatively low profile with regard to international crises, in spite 
of its growing material capabilities and global ambitions. Regarding the conflict in Syria, China 
has joined Russia several times in vetoing UNSC resolutions proposed by Western states. 
Moreover, the Chinese state media presents Russia’s military intervention in Syria in a positive 
light, as part of the war against terrorism. However, China does not provide any material or 
military support for Russia’s actions there. The limited Chinese engagement in the Syrian civil 
war illustrates that Beijing tends to acquiesce to Russia’s engagement in particular crises, but 
refrains from active support. 
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A look at three other areas demonstrates the growing discrepancy between China and Russia’s 
engagement in global governance: participation in UN peacekeeping efforts, contributions to 
development cooperation, and the fight against climate change. These three areas also show 
how Russia’s level of engagement has decreased in recent years, whereas China has gradually 
become more active. 
To begin, China’s participation in UN-led peacekeeping operations has steadily increased over 
the last decade. China now provides several thousand troops for this type of missions, ranging 
between 2,300 and 3,000 in 2015-2017. Moreover, in 2013, Chinese combat troops were for 
the first time ever deployed in a peacekeeping role in Mali (previously Chinese participation 
was limited to logistics and medical staff). Other missions with the participation of Chinese 
combat troops included South Sudan and Darfur. In 2015, China also promised to establish a 
10-year, USD1 billion China-UN peace and development fund; it offered USD100 million to the 
African Union for the purpose of establishing a rapid reaction force; and it committed itself to 
the creation of a special police unit of up to 8,000 troops for UN peacekeeping operations. 
Even if China’s increased engagement at times coincides with its commercial interests,4 there 
is no doubt that  Beijing has become more involved in UN peacekeeping efforts in recent years 
(Godement et al., 2018). Russia, meanwhile, has practically withdrawn from any participation 
in UN peacekeeping operations. The last Russian mission under UN aegis took place in 2006 
in Lebanon. A partial exception is Russia’s participation in the UN-led anti-piracy missions off 
the Horn of Africa since 2008. Russia also indirectly supports the peacekeeping mission in the 
Central African Republic (CAR). In late 2017, the UN agreed for Russia to provide the CAR 
government with light weapons and training. Overall, however, it is clear that Russia’s 
participation in peacekeeping missions is minimal. The reason is simple. The Kremlin does not 
see peacekeeping operations as increasing Russia’s international prestige or bringing any 
tangible benefits.  
Development cooperation is another area that illustrates the changing roles that Russia and 
China have come to play in global governance. Russia wanted to set up a separate national 
development assistance institution in 2007, when it adopted its first development 
cooperation strategy, later updated in 2014 (Rossiyskaya Federatsiya, 2014a). However, 
                                                 
4 According to critics, this is the case of China’s deployment of peacekeepers to South Sudan, see (Xie and 
Copeland, 2017). 
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following several years of bureaucratic infighting and the 2008-09 global economic crisis, the 
Kremlin decided to hand over development issues to the Federal Agency for the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad and International 
Humanitarian Cooperation (Rossotrudnichestvo). Handing over the portfolio of development 
issues to an agency responsible for cooperation primarily in the post-Soviet space testifies to 
the limited, regional scope of Russia’s ambitions. Between 2010 and 2012, Russia’s official 
development assistance (ODA) was around USD500 million and increased to above USD1 
billion in 2015 and 2016 (figures include debt cancellation). Bilateral development assistance 
makes up roughly 75% of overall ODA and remains concentrated on the post-Soviet space, 
with Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan being the biggest recipients (De Cordier, 2016; 
Zaytsev and Knobel, 2017). Following Russia’s intervention on behalf of the Assad regime, 
Syria has emerged as the most recent recipient of economic assistance. This shows that 
Moscow tends to use development aid almost exclusively for narrower instrumental purposes 
rather than as a contribution to global public goods. 
In contrast, China’s development assistance is global in scope and provides developing states 
with substantial financial resources. Beijing prefers to finance the construction of 
infrastructure, with a focus on African states. According to the OECD, China’s ODA in 2015 was 
USD3.1 billion, of which more than 90% was distributed via bilateral channels.5 As the findings 
of AidData show, Chinese infrastructure investments have narrowed economic inequalities 
within developing countries (Bluhm et al., 2018). This generous policy does not preclude some 
negative side-effects, as states supported by China are prone to enter the debt trap, just as in 
the case of previous Western and Soviet development assistance. Finally, it is worth noting 
that China’s growing experience in development assistance and plans for broadening it has 
led Beijing to establish a national development assistance agency in 2018. 
Climate change is yet another area that testifies to the differences in Russia and China’s 
participation in global governance. In the 2000s, Russia appeared to be a strong supporter of 
the fight against climate change. Instrumental considerations may have played a role, as the 
EU supported Russia’s bid for WTO membership in 2004 in exchange for Moscow’s 
participation in tackling climate change (Parker and Karlsson, 2010). Be that as it may, it was 
                                                 
5 Other assessments provide higher numbers but the details of particular agreements are rarely released publicly.  
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China – together with the US – who blocked the emergence of a new climate agreement 
during the summit in Copenhagen in 2009, leaving Russia and the EU on the side-lines. In 
recent years, however, the roles of China and Russia have reversed. Beijing is now ready to 
reduce carbon emissions. A series of pledges by Beijing paved the way for the conclusion of 
the 2015 Paris Agreement (Godement, 2015). Beijing has also promised financial assistance 
for developing countries so that they can meet their own targets (Hilton and Kerr, 2017). 
Indeed, after the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement under President Trump, China has 
come to portray itself as a leader in climate change mitigation. While Russia also joined the 
Paris Agreement, scholars observed an important shift in the discourse on climate change in 
Russia towards a much more sceptical attitude (Tynkkynen and Tynkkynen, 2018). This shift 
coincides with the unambitious target declared by Russia in the Paris Agreement. Moscow has 
promised to limit greenhouse gases emissions to 70-75% of the 1990 level by 2030, which will 
not be difficult given that in 2012 Russia’s emissions were below 68% of the 1990 level 
(Korppoo and Kokorin, 2017, p. 125). 
CONCLUSION: THE OBSTACLES TO LONG-TERM COOPERATION 
As the two previous sections demonstrate, Russia and China’s views on world order partly 
overlap and partly diverge. This means that contrary to the opinions of some observers (Blank, 
2018; see also Lukin, 2018; Luzyanin, 2018, p. 14), strategic cooperation between China and 
Russia cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the tensions between elements of convergence 
and divergence with regard to world order may emerge as the most serious long-term 
obstacle to closer cooperation between these two powers. 
To be sure, Russia and China’s defiance of Western primacy in international politics provides 
a basis for cooperation. Both countries distrust the West and oppose a number of policies 
pursued by the United States and its European allies. Russia and China agree on several 
aspects of the present world order that they would like to contain or change. These are first 
and foremost norms promoted by the West, not least liberal democratic principles and 
limitations on state sovereignty. Both Russia and China rebuff Western primacy and regard it 
as a threat both to their foreign policy interests and to their domestic regimes. At the same 
time, however, they do not fully agree on what alternative norms they would like to promote. 
While joint declarations paper over this divergence, the differences are more pronounced in 
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the patterns of Russia and China’s practical engagement with global governance and their 
attitudes towards globalization and anti-globalization movements. China appears to be 
genuinely interested in contributing to political and economic stability, while Russia seeks first 
and foremost the symbolic confirmation of its great-power status and does not mind the role 
of an occasional spoiler. 
To some extent, these differences are difficult for Russia and China to avoid as they stem from 
the different positions the two states occupy in the international system. Russia is still 
struggling to prevent its long-term decline, especially after a decade of fast economic growth 
in the 2000s was replaced by a decade of slow growth, stagnation and recession. Russia’s role 
in the global economy is basically limited to three sectors (energy resources, civilian nuclear 
power and the arms industry). China, in contrast, is a potential superpower, maintaining a fast 
pace of economic growth and being deeply integrated in the global economy. Moreover, 
several domestic challenges, such as environmental degradation and industrial overcapacity, 
push China to seek transnational solutions rather than rely on itself. As a result, China needs 
a relatively well-functioning world order much more than Russia does. Political and economic 
instability may harm Beijing’s interests to a larger extent than those of Moscow. 
The growing power gap between Russia and China contributes to both states’ different 
expectations with regard to world order. While Russia has significantly improved its great-
power status in the realm of global international security, mostly due to the intervention in 
Syria, it has not managed to upgrade its position in other global areas. It is rather following in 
China’s footsteps than playing an independent role. China, meanwhile, is building up its 
institutional capacity to engage more efficiently with the existing world order. Examples 
include both multilateral institutions, such as the AIIB, as well as China’s attempts to 
strengthen its domestic capacity – a case in point being the creation of China’s national 
development agency. Beijing is willing to cooperate with others, but it is also ready to go it 
alone as the creation of the AIIB, the Belt and Road Initiative or the Forum of Cooperation 
with Africa illustrate. 
This is perhaps not surprising. As indicated, Beijing has large economic resources at its disposal 
to shape practices of global governance, while Russia in most cases does not have much to 
offer apart from the provision of political-military support. Russia’s limited engagement with 
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global governance structures does not have to pose an obstacle for China or slow down Sino-
Russian cooperation. However, Russia’s instigation of instability may indirectly harm China in 
the long-term and emerge as a key obstacle to deeper strategic cooperation. Because of 
limited integration with the world economy and a narrow focus on energy and arms, Moscow 
would not be hurt by the reversal of globalization and the rise of economic protectionism to 
the same extent as China would. Indeed, Russia’s conflict with Ukraine illustrates Moscow’s 
potential for unintentionally damaging Chinese interests. One of the railway corridors 
envisioned to form the Silk Road Economic Belt linking China with Europe was supposed to go 
through Ukraine. China also planned to build a deep-sea port in Crimea. Russia’s takeover of 
Crimea and subsequent meddling in the Donbas region have practically eliminated the 
possibility of making Ukraine part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Finally, Russia’s support 
for anti-establishment and populist movements worldwide may fuel growing anti-immigrant 
attitudes that have the potential to hurt the Chinese diaspora, which is much more numerous 
than Russian émigrés.  
To sum up, the scope of shared interests between Russia and China, coupled with both 
leaderships’ efforts to pre-empt potential competition, has enabled the two countries to 
develop close relations in spite of growing asymmetries between them. The similarities in how 
they regard world order may turn out numerous enough to promote further cooperation. The 
differences, however, are influencing the long-term prospects of the relationship and have 
the potential to slow down collaboration between Moscow and Beijing. 
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